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Cooperation for Agricultural Development in Africa: The Role of Companies and Private Foundations

Having become a flagship in the international aid agenda, the question of the 'private sector's' role in development is now a popular topic, including in the field of agriculture. Under the effects of the food crises and hunger riots in the early 2000s, agriculture—which had been slowly pushed aside since the 1980s—was the subject of renewed interest. This new interest was seen equally in economic circles—with the rising agricultural commodities prices creating a new class of assets for international investors—and in the policy arena with official development assistance (ODA) redirected to agriculture under the guise of improving food security. This return to the international aid agenda was first seen as a positive sign for agricultural development in Africa, but today serious doubts have been raised in regard to modalities. Indeed, over the space of two decades, international cooperation has undergone noteworthy shifts. The 'private sector' has never been this interlinked in the conception, steering and implementation of aid [R1] while the role of companies and private foundations as aid actors has grown considerably. Often operating in tandem, companies' intervention in development aid is not limited to very formal corporate sponsorship through company foundations. Sometimes, a detailed examination of the stock portfolios held by these wealthy philanthropists, most of whom North American, who invest abroad is sometimes needed to reconstruct the links between foundations and multinational firms.

Introduction

While some companies seem to have turned away from ODA since the aid untying process (that put an end to making aid conditional on the purchase of goods and services from the donor country), recent trends cast doubt on this attitude. Agriculture is directly concerned by the intervention of these actors in aid, notably that of the world's largest foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, alongside the Rockefeller Foundation. Together in 2006, they dreamed up the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) that is currently the focus of sharp discussions with the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN). Launched in 2012, at the Camp David summit, the G8 New Alliance is a vast public-private partnership (PPP) [R5] on multilateral scale in which the investment of agrifood and seed industry multinationals (such as Monsanto, Louis Dreyfus and even Danone) form a major lever to attain the target of food security. Since June 2013, the two initiatives have, what is more, been linked by the Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership, a 47 million dollar program targeting the adoption of improved seeds and other key technologies and increased production by strengthening the seed industry. This partnership between American aid (USAid) and AGRA gives the latter a key role in implementing the New Alliance.

This companies' and foundations' intervention in aid is a source of controversy—in particular since most governments and international organisations, including the United Nations, seem to have given their political stamp of approval. Increasingly seen by international public donors as operational and strategic partners, their direct involvement in development raises questions as to the evolution of agricultural aid. Indeed, these initiatives promote a development model organised around the watchword of 'modernising' African agriculture, which is supposed to end the problem of hunger and food insecurity. Against a backdrop of agricultural market liberalisation policies, the emerging scenario gives multinationals the leading role in PPPs whose foundations facilitate marketing via institutional and financial support. These new actors' growing role in international solidarity is, however, cause for hesitation on the part of some African farmers' organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the south as in the north. The increasing intervention of companies and foundations in aid raises a certain number of questions: What kind of agriculture should be promoted? What risks do this involvement pose? Ultimately, can development objectives and company models be reconciled?

In this brief, we offer information shedding light on the apparent paradox between aid that is supposed to be independent of private economic interests but that is largely guided by the 'private sector' and clarify the implications for the agricultural sector. Special attention shall be paid to the New Alliance and AGRA, whose approaches are emblematic of recent trends in agricultural cooperation and around which the controversy is currently structured.

I – The 'Private Sector' for Development?

A. What Do We Mean by 'Private Sector'?

The expression 'private sector' is on everyone's lips, yet complete confusion reigns as to what exactly it is. Is the 'private sector' being evoked as aid recipient? Or as financer? In addition, are we talking about African SMEs, multinational firms, foundations or even civil society organisations? This ambiguity—fuelled at the highest levels by bodies such as the European Union that uses the generic category of 'non-state actors' to designate its development partners without distinguishing between companies and CSOs—helps cloud the issue.

The 'private sector' as aid recipient. This expression has a strategic element in light of the importance donors give to financing the 'private sector': determining the categories of actors that will be placed at the centre of development policies. Thus, one can understand the interest in expanding or limiting its scope, particularly in function of organisations' for-profit or not-for-profit status. This implies including or excluding non-profit 'private sector' organisations, among which farmers' organisations, from the definition. In this fight over semantics, the stakes are not merely symbolic. As the 2015 deadline to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is nearing, companies are lobbying internationally for aid to be directed to the development of businesses, including multinationals.

The 'private sector' as aid producer. The difficulty of determining the meaning of 'private sector' also applies to aid producers. Recently, a multitude of new actors have emerged. Multinational firms, foundations and financial actors (among which banks, investment funds [R2], and private equity funds specialised in shareholding in small private companies) are all organisations with which governments must now deal when it comes to financing, designing and implementing aid. The 'private sector' also made its official entry into the development community during the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 following Accra (2008) that had granted civil society full legitimacy as an actor in cooperation for development. Three years later, it is the 'private sector's' turn to be included in the 'global partnership to support international cooperation for development' (Busan declaration) although the precise outlines of this concept have not been clearly defined and as such it often seems to be confused with the face of the foundation. Already in 2010, the OECD Development Aid Committee (DAC) took into account in its statistics for the first time the disbursements by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which had become a true aid actor by directing nearly half of its funding abroad. Indeed, since its creation, the foundation has devoted more than 2 billion dollars to agricultural development, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, 380 million of which to AGRA.

B. The Success of Thinking on Business for Development

Base of the pyramid (BoP), social business, etc.—the aid community is examining the compatibility of entrepreneurial logics with social and environmental concerns. Arenas devoted to reflecting on these new models are emerging, hoping to create new synergies between public, private and solidarity-based actors. These examinations are emanating from cooperation actors as a whole, whether in the form of warnings from some advocacy NGOs denouncing the risks for food security in developing countries or in the form of expertise generally aiming to bring these two universes closer together under the effectiveness paradigm. This paradigm often colours the speech of large firms and donors who now see the involvement of the former as a necessity for development. The financial crisis that speed up the downward trend in public financing is not for nothing in the interest shown by international organisations and government aid agencies who reflect on the issue, sometimes accompanied in this by the associative sector.

Glossary

Social Business: Theorised by economist Muhammad Yunus, a social business is a company that aims to provide a solution to a societal problem while conserving the secondary goal of turning a profit. Shareholders are reimbursed for their investment, but do not receive dividends. The profits are fully reinvested in the company.

Base/Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP): Introduced in 1999 by Indian researcher Coimbatore K. Prahalad and his American colleague Stuart L. Hart, the concept promotes increasing the profits of multinationals who do business with the poor by offering goods or services that match the means of people at the 'bottom of the pyramid'.

Social Solidarity Economy (SSE): This expression covers organisations whose governance aims to be democratic along the principle of 'one person, one vote' and has the non-profit aim of meeting the needs of its members, associates or shareholders (cooperatives, mutual insurance schemes, associations). Although the definition covers foundations as well, some of the writing on the SSE draws a distinction between capital companies and associations of people, with foundations excluded from the latter.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): This concept concerns companies that voluntarily integrate social, environmental and economic concerns in their activities and interactions with their stakeholders

The success of the BoP. Among innovative entrepreneurial models, the BoP concept reactivating the myth of reconciliation between capitalist logic and social equity has recently encountered clear success. Although the extent of its real impact on poverty remains to be proven, it has generated a great deal of enthusiasm, notably in the G20 that presented it as a 'challenge' to overcome in 2011 and 2012. On the practical level, small companies, associations, foundations and government bodies were above all the ones seduced by the concept. International donors also positioned themselves in this area; for instance, the UNDP and its 'Growing Inclusive Markets' initiative aims to develop understanding of entrepreneurial models and inclusive markets contributing to development. Taken up by international organisations, the notion of BoP has simultaneously evolved in parallel to shifts in thinking on poverty under the influence of Amartya Sen's work. Starting from an income-based definition of poverty, it has become 'a multi-dimensional construct that includes material deprivation, lack of education, ill health,

vulnerability, and voicelessness and exclusion' [R3], making its impact all the more difficult to measure.

CSR, BoP, social business, SSE: different approaches. In 2001, the European Union published a green paper on promoting a European framework for corporate social responsibility. The idea of corporate accountability was accepted in the North and South as a necessity for sustainable development. At the time, the goal was to offset the negative social and environmental impacts acknowledged as inherent to the search for profits. Since then, perspectives have shifted. With multinational firms' recuperation of the social business concept, these points of friction seemed to give way to an impression of harmony around a near-natural link between the business world and the social development of developing countries.

The discourse of large companies often contains an amalgam of BoP and social business. In practice, the two notions are easily confused as they correspond on the ground to actions that structure the local economic fabric. Yet, while both are inspired by liberalism (business is the optimal vector for development), they have fundamental differences notably in regard to their relationship with the market, differentiating repairs from true policy. While the BoP concept postulates the market's positive consequences on poverty, the social business concept does not adhere to this vision of the natural benefits of an adjustment between supply and demand. On the contrary, it uses the market as a development tool by changing the underlying vocation of the company whose primary objective is no longer profits but meeting social targets. This explains why multinational firms protect themselves from a true reversal in the entrepreneurial logic behind their organisation by isolating the social business projects they instigate in independent structures such as investment funds.

Less frequent but still present is multinational firms' assimilation of some of their projects with the social solidarity economy, facilitated by the dilution of the concept into that of social entrepreneurship. The latter reintroduces the possibility of turning a profit and, proclaiming companies able to attain social, societal and/or environmental targets, questions the historical legitimacy of social economy structures, including farmers' organisations. Beyond an interest in terms of image, a much greater doubt weighs over multinational firms who take up the ideas of social business and social solidarity economy: doing so may be a strategy to capture new markets in sectors that have social dimensions.

C. Development NGOs and Companies Moving Closer Together

What NGO/Business Relations? The NGO milieu is relatively split on the question, wavering between mistrust and gratitude. Some associations see this as an opportunity for development while others are much more critical. Although NGO positions can be differentiated in such different registers as collaboration or advocacy, they do not necessarily exclude each other in the position that associations adopt in regard to the 'private sector'. Certain organisations are content with being in clear opposition. Others attempt collaboration while also continuing to encourage and raise awareness. This is the case for many that, engaged in partnerships with companies, have reflected collectively on recent collaborations with private firms. Paradoxically, while some development associations have a tradition of intervening in the agricultural sector, there are so few projects targeting the sector that we can imagine it has little interest for the companies for which it is the centre of their business. Among other things, in France's case, the few projects in favour of agricultural development concern above all supporting SMEs to set up new economic value chains [R4]. Generally speaking, these new 'operational collaborations' change the nature of the relationships maintained by NGOs and businesses. Until recently, financial sponsorship was the most widespread modality and did not involve the heart of their respective carriers. Companies committed funding without any say over how NGOs spent the funds. Things are different today and we see a trend of companies and NGOs projecting themselves with the aim of a new relationship motivated by a concern for results [R4]. Thinking within the association and within the company are affected by these joint projects, which raises the question of what pushes them to collaborate.

Why work together? For NGOs, one big reason is to offset the drop in ODA. Fund raising is the primary motivation. NGOs also talk about complementarity in skills and the idea that these partnerships could improve the living conditions of local populations; they even address the public authorities on the need for collaboration between companies, associations and government bodies for development. For companies wishing to showcase CSR methods, NGOs have expertise in the field. Agrifood companies' adoption of CSR discourse is also part of a logic of setting products apart based on quality. Indeed, food markets in wealthy countries tend to be saturated and this re-appropriation of social and environmental concerns seems in part to be the result of a marketing strategy. But it is also largely the work of activists in the associative milieu that is behind the normalisation of the idea of the 'private sector's' social and environmental responsibility that now sees an interest in moving closer to the associative sector. This is particularly the case as the obligations of donors that work with businesses on the multilateral level (IFC (a WB subsidiary), regional banks, COFACE and PROPARCO in France) are tightening as they add provisions regarding applicant companies' CSR qualifications to their procurement and contracting procedures. By forging ties with the associative milieu, companies give themselves the strategic means to improve their images.

II – The Emergence of an Agricultural Development Model Guided by the 'Private Sector'

Building around the concept of 'modernising' African agriculture, a vision is now promoted by certain political bodies more specifically sensitive to the idea of a Green Revolution in Africa such as the World Economic Forum, World Bank and G8, mobilised in its favour. This watchword has been a recurrent presence since the start of the colonial period and is currently tending to impose itself as the dominant line of thought in agricultural development. This model has made such inroads largely because of the Gates and Rockefeller foundations—via AGRA—and large companies, more specifically the Norwegian multinational Yara. Initially focusing on improving productivity through fertiliser use (See Inter-Réseaux's Special Bulletin (No.

198) on Fertilizer) actions undertaken are leaning toward a more comprehensive approach that is no longer limited to the provision of inputs and is progressively expanding, all at the initiative of multinational firms.

A. Companies' and Foundations' Influence on Visions of Development

The 'growth corridor' concept: Yara's role as catalyst. It all started in 2004 when Kofi Annan, then Secretary General of the United Nations, launched the idea of a 'green revolution' in Africa at the international conference on hunger in Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For him, it was a matter of '[generating an] African Green Revolution—a revolution that is long overdue' (AFP press archive). Yara created an Africa Program in response to this call and, in 2005, launched the Yara Foundation for a green revolution in Africa. Like Monsanto, Unilever and the Rockefeller Foundation, it took part in the Task Force on Hunger for the 'Millennium Goals' Project (launched by Kofi Annan with the aim of halving world hunger by 2015) and made a good impression by being the first to commit to the United Nations Millennium Villages projects for which it financed two installations in Kenya and Malawi. What is more, it is this involvement in the UN Millennium Villages that later caused the company to be invited to the United Nations General Assembly on the MDGs in 2010 as the 'farming first delegate' alongside four other members of the International Fertilizer Industry Association (IFA). In the meantime, the multinational launched its 'growth corridor' concept before the representatives of the organisation's member-States. Using the 'trickle-down' theory to justify giving priority to growth (which in time is supposed to impact poverty), the aim is to build infrastructures, which are supposed to attract investments and facilitate the development of commercial farming to facilitate the conversion of land for industrial agriculture. Yara managed to place the concept at the heart of the New Alliance in 2012 by working through the Davos Forum in 2010 in collaboration with the G8/G20 on the 'New Vision for Agriculture' initiative. This was a huge shift insomuch as a large company had been promoted from its status of funder to that of co-producer of multilateral cooperation. This normalisation of multinationals as aid actors means that they help dictate 'good' agricultural development recipes—a prefect illustration of this is the growth corridors example. Yara developed the concept and acted as catalyst, positioning itself as the instigator of partnerships of this type in Mozambique and Tanzania. The two best known corridors are the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor in Mozambique (BAGC) and the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Indeed, the multinational has managed to involve a number of partners (including other multinationals, AGRA, NEPAD, FAO, World Bank, and governments of donor countries) who signed the SAGCOT agreement that now serves as the basis for New Alliance operations in Tanzania. Yet, these corridors are strongly criticised by civil society actors and researchers when it comes to their capacity to ensure food security and the appropriateness of companies' methods: 'corporations see major potential for developing commercial high input agriculture in regions, primarily African countries, which have not yet experienced it, opening fresh opportunities for the sale of proprietary seed, fertilizers, pesticides, machinery and business for the whole supply chain. By bringing together governments, corporations and international institutions in the corridor projects, they hope to generate advantages and economies of scale to increase profits' [R6].

A Green Revolution in Africa: the first steps in the New Alliance. To understand the success of the idea of a green revolution in Africa, one must take a look at the influence exercised by companies and foundations on the discussions on aid. The resonance of these ideas owes a great deal to the organisation of cycles of conferences and forums that regularly bring together companies and African governments and solidify networks around shared ideas. By helping the concept of public-private partnership, the value chain approach, contract farming, the idea of productivity improvement and the key role of financial mechanisms to become hackneyed, they create the conditions for programs such as the New Alliance to succeed. What is more, the company Yara—now a participant in the New Alliance—is the one that laid its foundations a few years previously. Yara promised to invest in Ethiopia, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Tanzania where it had already built a fertiliser terminal in 2012 as part of the SAGCOT. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, it has supplied fertiliser through development aid, notably in Tanzania. In 2006, the multinational triggered the process that lead to the New Alliance by organising the 'African Green Revolution Conference'. Following this meeting, the African Heads of State and Government meeting in the African Union (AU) adopted the 'Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for the African Green Revolution'. In this document, they pledge to increase fertiliser use sixfold by 2015, notably by setting up 'appropriate measures such as tax incentives', the '[immediate] elimination of taxes and tariffs on fertilizer and on fertilizer raw materials', and the establishment of fertiliser procurement and distribution facilities 'through strategic public-private partnerships'. Yara repeated the experience and organised a second large conference in 2007. It managed to bring together 18 Ministers of Finance and of Agriculture from 12 African countries around the adoption of the 'Oslo Declaration on the African Green Revolution' and the accompanying agenda for action, which were supposed to support Africa's strategy to develop agriculture (CAADP). The following year marked the end of the conference cycle organised by the multinational, and the company went even further in 2010 by creating with AGRA an arena called the 'African Green Revolution Forum' (AGRF). Presided over by Kofi Annan and co-sponsored by AGRA (with Kofi Annan as its president), the AGRF received the support of international bodies such as IFAD and the African Development Bank. Bringing together private agrifood companies, financial institutions, African governments, NGOs and farmers, the forum promotes investments and supports agricultural productivity policy. Investment plans are drawn up in this arena to accomplish the green revolution in Africa.

The art of transmitting ideas on development. Through AGRA, the Gates and Rockefeller foundations also finance the Global Harvest Initiative (GHI) that some denounce as a tool of the American agroindustry to create new outlets since those on its own territory are no longer sufficient. Founded in 2009 by world leaders in the seed industry Monsanto and DuPont (also part of the New Alliance), the GHI's board of directors still contains other suppliers of genetically modified seed and global manufacturers of agricultural equipment. The organisation also publishes an annual report on 'Global Agricultural Productivity' in which agricultural productivity is presented as the key to improving world food security. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation does not restrict itself to financing thematic initiatives because it also supports major media, universities, public development agencies and even national institutes of research for development. And the Gates couple is also found behind

certain associations such as ONE, which presents itself as an advocacy organisation to fight poverty in Africa. While the singer Bono is held up as co-founder of the association, people from several foundations, including the Gates foundation, sit on its board of directors alongside public figures such as Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser for George W. Bush in the early 2000s. ONE intends to put pressure on political leaders to support 'effective programs and policies' and supports the New Alliance that it see as 'an encouraging step towards including the private sector in the growth and development of Africa's agriculture sector' (ONE website). Legitimising this type of initiative through associations and the concomitant influence strategies raises issues, particularly in light of ONE's extensive presence notably within European circles.

Whether through the intermediary of NGOs, platforms or the media, the company/foundation couple has found in this a way to legitimise itself as development actors and promote initiatives such as the NASFN. Yet, this influence over ideas deserves as much scrutiny as the programs implemented insomuch as these ideas tend to be relayed by governments whose development policies are steered by this entrepreneurial approach to aid.

B. The New Alliance: An Initiative by Multinationals?

The 'new vision for agriculture' of company heads at the Davos Forum. It is no accident that Yara prides itself on having been the primary representative of the 'private sector' during the Group of Eight meeting in 2012 when President Barack Obama announced the New Alliance. Behind the official launch by the G8, multinationals—especially Yara—orchestrated the establishment of this initiative with the complicity of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the AU in conjunction with NEPAD. Indeed, the New Alliance was largely inspired by 'Grow Africa' (GA) created in 2011 by the AU Commission, the NEPAD agency and the WEF, and Yara—co-chair of the institution—played a key role in its establishment. This public-private platform, created by a group of European company heads, brings together economic and political policymakers and representatives of international organisations and civil society. It emerged following the 2010 WEF during which the Consumer Industries Community had launched the 'new vision for agriculture', a shared agenda for action for sustainable agricultural growth. This initiative formalises this paradigm of agriculture modernisation: 'The New Vision integrates food and nutritional security, environmental sustainability and economic opportunity, with a goal of improving each by 20% per decade until 2050. The New Vision advocates for a market-based approach to sustainably increase productivity and opportunities in the agricultural sector', (WEF, 2013). Concretely, large PPPs (four to date: Mexico, Vietnam, Indonesia and India) with 28 companies involved in the WEF, including BASF, Bayer, Bunge, Cargill, CF DuPont, Monsanto, Nestlé, PepsiCo, Rabobank International, Syngenta, Coca-Cola, Unilever and Yara. The initiative is lead by the WEF's Global Agenda Council on Food Security that consists of Jane Karuku, president of AGRA, and other well-known figures such as David Nabarro, co-chair of the council who gives the initiative the UN's stamp of approval (he is the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Food Security and Nutrition). What is more, G20 Ministers have recognised the 'new vision' initiatives as 'innovative models of public-private partnership that can strengthen global food security' (WEF, 2013). In 2011, the initiative supported the activities of a working group on food security (B20 summit) composed, among other things, of company heads; this working group ultimately enabled the participation of the 'private sector' in the G20.

From the 'new vision' to the 'new alliance': the role of Grow Africa. The WEF deploys this strategy of a 'new vision' especially in Africa by creating the regional GA partnership platform that commits eight African countries in PPPs. Supporting the green revolution in Africa, it aims to create partnerships between African governments and the 'private sector' by elaborating investment plans supporting the CAADP and national strategies for agricultural growth. In January 2012, for the WEF annual meeting and the AU Summit, African leaders and companies pledged to launch a 'New Alliance' for food and agriculture in Africa using the G8 as a launch platform. It was in preparation for this announcement a few months later in Camp David that GA was called to catalyse companies' pledges for the New Alliance, presumed to align with the CAADP. As could be expected, Yara and McKinsey supported this leadership of GA is establishing the New Alliance, supplying staff and resources [R7]. GA was thus able to fulfil its mission by organising a ministerial meeting with the Ministers of seven African countries who agreed on a roadmap to prepare the simultaneous launch of the G8 New Alliance and the first investment forum in May 2012. The forum led to nearly forty partnership pledges between multinationals and governments, the progression of which are supposed to be supervised by a Governing Board convened by the G8 and GA.

While they were laying the bases of the New Alliance, the WEF companies and their strong arm for Africa, GA, helped define good PPP practices, not as practical modalities but as a new global framework for aid. By supplying technical assistance, creating a network of companies, organising a yearly 'investment forum' and promoting 'good' practices (such as inclusive business models), they create a normative dynamic and spread these new norms to international aid. Behind the image of governments at the controls of aid displayed by the G8's launch of the New Alliance, multinationals seem to oversee operations: twenty-eight firms alone cover the entire production chain from seed and chemical inputs to production, processing, transportation, marketing and supermarkets [R7].

III - Controversial Agricultural Modernisation Projects

A. Conditional Investments: CSOs' Worries

The New Alliance at the service of the CAADP: a subordination principle in question. Major multinational companies were largely the ones who set up the New Alliance, but it was the AU, NEPAD, the CAADP and the governments of six African countries who have committed themselves in this partnership with the G8 and nearly one hundred national and international companies: 'according to the theses defended within NEPAD, after several decades, agriculture underpinned by family farms has not enabled true economic development in sub-Saharan Africa and new strategies consequently seem to be

converging around the promotion of agribusiness turned mostly to foreign markets, notably the global market' (thematic workshop on 'rural land tenure and sustainable development', Praia+9 Conference). In this modernisation-based approach, African governments are supported by the governments of developed countries and by multilateral actors (World Bank, FAO, IFAD) who have rapidly embraced the approach. However, civil society organisations in Africa and the North along with FOs (PROPAC, ROPPA) point a finger at a model based on the actions of multinational firms whose virtues in regard to the official objective of fighting food insecurity are in doubt. Whether through AGRA or the New Alliance, African and international associations have a unique interpretation of these initiatives: 'The multinationals are setting the terms: harmonisation, free trade and protection of private IP or no investment' [R8]. Yet, multinationals' investments in the framework of the New Alliance are supposed to support CAADP national investment plans for agriculture and food security (the PNSR). What is more, 'the fact that these initiatives fall under cover of the African Union CAADP gives them the appearance of being African projects' (CCFD, June 2013). For CSOs, however, the obligations laid down by the CAADP seem weak compared to the terms set by companies. Some go even further and claim that this institutional framework would make companies' task easier as it is 'a compromised instrument, calling for the very policies and programmes favoured by the multinationals' [R8]. This interpretation of the CAADP is not shared by everyone, however. A document published recently by GRET describes very limited consideration of private investment in NAIPs: 'Some countries address the subject but do not take it into account in programming. [...] Sierra Leone is the only country to have a budget for 'private sector' promotion, and this budget is only 2% of the total NAIP budget. NAIPs are still very clearly operating from the logic of government programming of investments' (GRET, 2013).

International aid: a new playing field for competition between multinationals? Whether through the intermediary of the CAADP or not, most CSOs share the conviction that these conditional investments could facilitate large-scale land grabs. The New Alliance partners' promises to comply with Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests ('Voluntary Guidelines') and the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAIs) have not been enough to ease fears. These fears are fuelled by the practices of large groups such as Louis Dreyfus that takes part in the New Alliance but at the same time signed a January 2012 agreement with Ivorian government for the provision of several thousand hectares of farmland in the north of the country to grow rice. This agreement allowed it to beat its competitor for the signature of this agreement, the Mimran Group (present in the sugar/bioethanol/grain sector in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire as well as in international trade, maritime transport and supply), also involved in the New Alliance—thus supporting the hypothesis of competition between agribusiness in the field of aid. Unsurprisingly, the Louis Dreyfus Group was to intervene in the rice value chain through a PPP for the New Alliance, profiting from renovations to hydroagricultural infrastructures by the Ivorian government with European Union support (see the G8 cooperation framework for New Alliance support in Côte d'Ivoire). Worries also focus on the risks of speculation on agricultural commodities by agroindustrial multinationals such as Louis Dreyfus. In an Issue Briefing ('Not a Game: Speculation vs. Food Security. Regulating Financial Markets to Grow a Better Future' – October 2011), Oxfam recently pointed a finger at speculation by commercial actors, made possible by the exemption from position limits of these giants in the world trade of agricultural commodities. This rule exempts them from staying under the ceiling imposed on financial actors as to the number of contracts passed on a given commodity in a set lapse of time. They can therefore use their position as 'commercial players' in physical markets to engage in financial speculation. These criticisms are generally not taken into account by the governments involved in the New Alliance, with the exception of France that announced measures to offset these risks of land grabbing and speculation.

B. The Suspicion of Conquering New Markets

Value chain structure: a modus operandi. By creating AGRA, the Gates and Rockefeller foundations invested in the agricultural sector using the same intervention schema already applied in Africa in the field of health care through the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) launched in 2000. Their operating mode consists of providing aid that can structure markets, whether for malaria vaccines or inputs. For this, AGRA structures an entire value chain of hybrid seeds and inputs by financing research, company start-ups and the creation of a marketing network through the Program for Africa's Seed Systems (PASS). In addition, while the initial project focused only on seed systems, it was rapidly expanded to cover market construction with the long-term prospect of commercial opportunities in processing and marketing. Today, criticisms focus on the inputs market. In September 2012, more than 350 organisations representing the interests of farmers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe issued a declaration protesting the agricultural methods of AGRA and its seed program [R9]. This program's detractors have several levels of criticism for the program, including farmers' exclusion from the process, poor knowledge of the harmful effects of introducing hybrid varieties, and above all perplexity as to its appropriateness. With the system of seed patenting by multinationals such as Monsanto who therefore control their use, the suspicion that Northern companies aim to conquer markets and primarily the inputs market is very present: 'This renewed interest in African agriculture is framed in the logic of the Green Revolution: introduce hybrid (or potentially genetically modified) seeds that, used in conjunction with irrigation and chemical fertilizers and pesticides, produce higher yields. Drawing small-holder farmers into a cash economy through the provision of credit is fundamental to this process' [R8].

The 'Trojan horse' of old-school tied aid (Expression used in a position paper on the G8 New Alliance by Action Contre la Faim): this is the suspicion that floats over AGRA and the New Alliance. The presence of a genetically modified agricultural seed giant such as Monsanto in the New Alliance fans fears on the subject. As does that of the Louis Dreyfus company that declared in 2011 its desire to attain the rank of 'major player in the African agrifood market' (according to commodafrica.com). Particularly when the group is known to have recently expanded into the provision of inputs by buying SCPA–Sivex International (SSI) in 2011. SSI is the subsidiary of a public group specialised in the processing and distribution of fertiliser and chemical products, notably in West and Central Africa where it has eight subsidiaries. In addition, Bill Gates is a shareholder in the seed giant Monsanto and the

commodities trade giant Cargill, and as such some actors have the same suspicions about his foundation and AGRA, which they say could serve a long-term strategy to conquer new markets. Those raising the alarm see such projects as part of a strategy to establish genetically modified crops in Africa: 'AGRA is said to be working for large global seed companies that have mandated it to clear the way for the massive introduction of genetically modified varieties' [R10]. Outside AGRA, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation finances many other PPPs with the same multinationals currently in the New Alliance (DuPont, Cargill, Unilever, Nestlé, Coca-Cola, Olam, etc.) for projects aiming to transform African agriculture, sometimes going so far as to introduce new crops as was the case with a soy value chain development project in Africa launched in 2010 with Cargill, in partnership with the NGO TechnoServe. The New Alliance also plans the establishment of a New Alliance Technology Platform to improve 'the delivery of improved agricultural technologies' (CGIAR, 2013) by the duo consisting of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA). The missions adopted by the platform include connecting research bodies (through the FARA umbrella structure bringing together African agricultural researchers) and private companies for the rapid dissemination of 'improved technologies' and broader use of hybrid seed.

Conclusion

The outlines of a blueprint for foundations' and companies' interventions in cooperation now seem to be emerging. First deployed in the field of health, it is now spreading to agriculture and tends to confirm the idea of a progressive 'privatisation' of international aid. The appropriateness of for-profit actors' contribution to agricultural development in Africa is still in question, but their presence continues to extend to all levels of the production chain. Today, while the G8 New Alliance reaches upstream markets, the topic of nutrition—which is gaining importance in the policy agenda—is opening doors to downstream markets. The discussions are still framed by the same actors (the Gates Foundation, Vice-Chair of the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) that brings together governments, international organisations, civil society and 'private sector' actors) and still take place in the same arenas, notably the WEF where nutrition and food security were counted among the subjects discussed in 2013. Simultaneously, the blurring of lines between genres is speeding up, similar to GAIN that, after being created as a foundation, was granted the status of international organisation in 2010 by the Swiss government. This is another opportunity for global agrifood giants Unilever, Danone, PepsiCo and Coca-Cola as well as their 600 partner companies to penetrate new markets at the bottom of the pyramid. Generating as much hope as fear, the 'private sector' and its participation in international aid is an important topic for all those concerned by agricultural development in Africa because it raises a question that has implications well beyond cooperation for development: that of the policy framework in which these mechanisms operate and the agricultural policy models that these new players tend to advance as the only option.

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RÉFÉRENCES RÉFÉRENCES RÉFÉRENCES RÉFÉRENCES RÉFÉRENCES RÉFÉRENCES

R1 Reality of Aid Report: 'Aid and the Private Sector: Catalysing Poverty Reduction and Development?', 2012
A crosscutting report (302 pages) that aims to shed light on the relationships between aid and the 'private sector' and provides articles by authors from CSOs in the north and south. Half way through the document, readers can consult the reports on global aid trends by country (BRICS and OECD countries).
http://www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ROA_Report_2012-Aid_and_the_Private_Sector1.pdf

R2 Interview: Un premier fonds d'investissement privé pour l'Afrique, 2013
Interview with Gilles Peltier, member of the African Agricultural Fund (AAF) supervisory board for the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) until June 2012. He describes in detail the modalities of this fund designed to prevent deviation from its single objective: ensure the continent's food security.
http://www.agenceecofin.com/investissement/1503-9566-l-african-agriculture-fund-acheve-sa-seconde-capitalisation

R3 Reviewing a Decade of Research on the 'Base/Bottom of the Pyramid' (BOP) Concept, 2012
Published in the journal *Business & Society*, this article covers research into the 'Base/Bottom of the Pyramid' concept over the past decade.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193938

R4 Coordination SUD/MEDEF Report: 'Entreprises et ONG de solidarité internationale – Quels partenariats pour quels objectifs ?', 2009
A joint publication by MEDEF and Coordination SUD offering an analysis of NGO/business relations (and a noteworthy typology of partnerships). The report contains concrete proposals to improve these relations.
http://www.coordinationsud.org/wp-content/uploads/ONG-_entreprise_165x240.pdf

R5 Academic article: 'Partenariats public-privé et politique de développement', 2005
A particularly useful article to clarify the PPP concept as applied to cooperation for development.
http://aspd.revues.org/365

R6 EcoNexus Report: 'African Agricultural Growth Corridors and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition: Who Benefits, Who Loses?', 2013
A report examining the growth corridor concept promoted by YARA and the G8 New Alliance.
http://inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf/African_Agricultural_Growth_Corridors___New_Alliance_-_EcoNexus_June_2013.pdf

R7 Grow Africa Report: Investing in the Future of African Agriculture, 2012-2013
Annual report by the platform Grow Africa presenting 'private sector' investments supposedly supporting the CAADP for each of the 8 African countries concerned by the WEF's 'new vision' strategy.
http://growafrica.com/Grow_Africa_Annual_Report_May_2013.pdf

R8 INADES Petition: 'Modernising African Agriculture: Who Benefits?', 2013
A petition launched by African civil society to denounce the New Alliance, and signed by many African and international organisations (Via Campesina, African Biodiversity Network, etc.) and FOs (PROPAC, ROPPA).
http://www.inadesfo.net/Petition-A-qui-profite-la?&lang=en

R9 CSO Declaration: 'Statement on AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa)', 2012
This declaration is signed by more than 350 organisations representing the interests of African farmers who protest AGRA's agricultural methods and its seed program.
http://www.acbio.org.za/images/stories/dmdocuments/Statement-AGRA-25Sep2012.pdf

R10 Défis Sud Articles: 'Révolution verte en Afrique : Un «miracle» à copier et à coller ?', No. 112- 2013
A critical analysis of AGRA and its operational program, the Program for Africa's Seed Systems (PASS).
http://www.sosfaim.be/pdf/publications/defis_sud/112/defis_sud_agra_burkina.pdf

See also: 'Bill, Melinda et les ONG', No. 111, February/March 2013
Here, Défis Sud authors an analysis that addresses foundations, new aid actors, and focuses specifically on their relations with NGOs.
http://www.sosfaim.be/pdf/publications/defis_sud/111/defis_sud_ong_bill_melinda_gates.pdf

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